

RIGHT TO PROTEST LTD

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RE: MPS POLICY ANNOUNCED 13 FEBRUARY 2026 – CONCERNS REGARDING DEFERRED ENFORCEMENT, DISCRIMINATORY SURVEILLANCE, AND STATUTORY COMPLIANCE


We write in pursuance of our letters dated 27 August 2025, 26 September 2025, 4 October 2025, 30 October 2025, and 30 November 2025. We rely on those letters in full and will not repeat their entire contents here.

We write concerning the MPS's policy on 13th February 2026¹, following the High Court's judgment on the proscription of Palestine Action of the same date.

Following the High Court's judgment in the judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to proscribe Palestine Action, the MPS announced a new policing policy stating that Palestine Action remained a proscribed group and that support of the group would remain a criminal offence. The

¹ <https://news.met.police.uk/news/met-response-to-high-court-ruling-on-palestine-action-506156>

MPS however stated that they would not arrest at the time of the commission of the offence, but instead gather 'evidence' for enforcement at a later date.



We contend that this policy constitutes:

1. **Unlawful entrapment** including of vulnerable members of the public
2. **Systematic breach of statutory duties** under the Terrorism Act 2000, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and Serious Crime Act 2007
3. **Unlawful discrimination** contrary to the Equality Act 2010 and Articles 10, 11, and 14 ECHR
4. **Abuse of facial recognition technology** as a discriminatory surveillance tool contrary to the Equality Act 2010 and Articles 10, 11 and 14 ECHR.

The MPS's statement represents a deliberate, systematic policy designed to maximise arrests and convictions of pro-Palestinian protesters while creating a false sense of security that supporting Palestine Action remains lawful.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY

On 13th February 2026, the High Court ruled that the Secretary of State's decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful due to procedural defects in how the decision was reached. However, as the MPS correctly identified in their statement, the High Court ruled that the unlawfulness of the ban notwithstanding, Palestine Action remains proscribed pending the outcome of any Government appeal.

In the MPS's public announcement, the MPS stated:

"The High Court has found that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful. However, the group remains proscribed pending the outcome of any Government appeal, which means expressing support is still a criminal offence."

The MPS then announced, in terms, that:

“From a Metropolitan Police Perspective, officers will continue to identify offences where support for Palestine Action is being expressed, but they will focus on gathering evidence of those offences and the people involved to provide opportunities for enforcement at a later date, rather than making arrests at the time.”

The MPS further stated that:

“This approach relates solely to the expression of support for Palestine Action.”

Significantly the MPS further stated that this policy does not apply to other unlawful offence:

“We will continue to intervene and make arrests where we see people crossing the line from lawful protest to intimidate, to damage property, to use violence, to stir up racial hatred or to commit other offences.”

THE PATTERN OF ENTRAPMENT: RIGHT TO PROTEST’S (‘RtP’) CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MPS REGARDING DEFEND OUR JURIES “LIFT THE BAN” CAMPAIGN:

The announced policy does not arise in isolation. It sits squarely within a pattern we, RtP have repeatedly raised with you since September 2025: namely, MPS’ silence and non-intervention in circumstances where terrorism-related offending is foreseeable and being actively promoted, coupled with messaging and omissions that create public confusion and a false sense of lawfulness of actions taken.

We have written to you repeatedly raising serious concerns about the MPS's conduct in relation to the Defend Our Juries ("DoJ") "Lift the Ban" campaign. A comprehensive summary follows:

26th September 2025 - Window Poster Campaign Complaint

On 26th September 2025, we wrote to Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist regarding DoJ's window poster campaign encouraging members of the public to download, print, and display posters stating *"I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action"* in their windows visible to the public.

We raised that outward-facing window displays directed at the public are capable of engaging Terrorism Act offences (including section 13), and we raised safeguarding and Prevent concerns: vulnerable members of the public were being actively recruited into criminal exposure by campaigns designed to create confusion about legality.

We raised concerns that:

- This could amount to an offence under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as displays facing the public from windows constitute displays in a "public place" according to established case law
- The MPS had statutory powers under sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorism Act 2006 to request removal of the DoJ website promoting this unlawful activity
- The MPS had previously taken down the DoJ website and intervened to prevent Zoom meetings, yet was now permitting the window poster campaign to continue

- The MPS had duties under section 38B Terrorism Act 2000 to act on information about terrorism offences
- The MPS was failing its safeguarding duties under section 26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 ("CTSA 2015") by allowing vulnerable people to be misled into committing strict liability terrorism offences

On **6 October 2025**, we received a response from PC James Armstrong of the Directorate of Professional Standards who responded:

"I have shared your submission to the counter terrorism command informing them of your complaint and the issues raised. If a response is possible I have asked that they provide one."

We received no further response from Counter Terrorism Command.

9 October 2025 – LBC Report on MPS Position

LBC published an article titled *"Displaying Palestine Action posters in windows not illegal, Met Police says"* regarding a poster in Peckham, south-east London, displaying *"I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action"* visible to the public from the street. The image in the article showed the poster to be the one on the DoJ website, for the public to download and display².



² https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/displaying-palestine-action-posters-legal-5HjdF8p_2/

LBC reported having seen a letter from a Metropolitan Police inspector stating:

"We have looked into this matter and our lawyers say it is not an offence for this poster to be displayed from private premises, even if it can be seen from the street. This is to do with the precise wording of the legislation."

Thus, while the MPS declined to clarify its legal position with us, it provided written interpretation to others confirming that no terrorism offences were engaged when such material was displayed from private premises visible to the public.

30 October 2025 – Request for Confirmation of MPS Position

On 30 October 2025, we wrote again seeking urgent confirmation of the MPS's legal position on display and dissemination from private premises, including whether the same position would apply equally to *all* Schedule 2 proscribed organisations, in equal circumstances, namely simply substituting the group 'Palestine Action' to another on the Schedule 2 list.

We highlighted the profound implications of any position suggesting that material supporting a proscribed organisation could be lawfully displayed from private premises even if plainly visible to the public, and the discriminatory implications if this position were being treated as a special carve-out for Palestine Action-related material.

3 November 2025 – Assistant Commissioner Adelekan response

On 3 November 2025, T/Assistant Commissioner Adelekan responded.

His letter asserted reliance on "*legal advice*" and "*current case law*", and maintained that display of material from within private premises, even if visible to the public, does not *automatically* constitute an offence under section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000. The letter further stated that this approach applies to all organisations listed in Schedule 2. The substantive legal advice, nor the case law relied upon were provided.

However, the formulation used in that response contradicted the wording in the MPS letter reported by LBC. The 3 November letter to Right to Protest Ltd emphasised that matters remain "*case-by-case*", and expressly declined to provide the unequivocal confirmations we sought in the terms requested.

There is therefore a clear distinction between:

- the public-facing reassurance by MPS reported by LBC that such display "*is not an offence*"; and
- the internal position provided to us that it does not "*automatically*" constitute an offence and remains subject to "*case-by-case*" assessment

That discrepancy was never publicly resolved by the MPS, with only the letter reported by LBC remaining in the public sphere.

Furthermore, critically, the letter failed to address why the MPS was applying this interpretation selectively only to Palestine Action-related material while not clarifying whether the same interpretation would apply to materials supporting other Schedule 2 proscribed organisations such as Hizballah.

The practical consequence was entirely foreseeable. Members of the public were left with the clear impression—reinforced both by media reporting of a letter from the MPS and by visible non-enforcement by MPS officers on the ground—that outward-facing expressions of support for Palestine Action from private premises were lawful. The result has been, and remains, the creation of widespread public confusion and false reassurance that support of Palestine Action, when displayed openly to the public, can be lawful and are thus tolerated by the MPS.

4 October 2025 – Complaint Regarding Assistant Commissioner Adelekan's Letter to DoJ

On 4th October 2025, We wrote regarding Assistant Commissioner Adelekan's letter dated 2 October 2025 to DoJ, in which he stated:

"This weekend we would ask you to consider pausing your activity and postponing it for another weekend."

"We are happy to meet virtually or otherwise to discuss this matter further."

We raised that this letter confirmed beyond doubt that DoJ gatherings were lawful assemblies under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, as the MPS sought only postponement—not prevention or prohibition—of the event.

We identified that this amounted to:

i. Breach of Section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998

Section 17(1) imposes a positive duty on the MPS to "exercise their various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that they reasonably can to prevent, (a) crime and disorder in its area."

If the MPS genuinely believed that participation would constitute terrorism offences, their statutory duty was to prevent those crimes—not to reschedule them for a more convenient day. By seeking postponement instead, the MPS implicitly accepted that no crime was reasonably anticipated.

ii. Facilitation of Terrorism Offences contrary to Section 12 Terrorism Act 2000

By expressing willingness to meet with DoJ to agree a new date for the event, the Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner affirmed they were prepared to facilitate it. If they truly believed terrorism offences were to be committed, facilitating and knowingly permitting such an event would render the MPS and its senior officers complicit in those offences under section 12 Terrorism Act 2000.

iii. Entrapment and Abuse of Power

We stated that the MPS's conduct amounted to entrapment by:

- Recognising DoJ demonstrations as lawful "planned events" capable of being postponed through engagement
- Encouraging postponement rather than exercising statutory duty of prevention
- Unlawfully arresting attendees under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000

We further noted this entrapment was directed against individuals sharing a protected characteristic (opposition to genocide and support for Palestinian rights) under section 10 Equality Act 2010, thereby breaching sections 4, 10, and 149 of the Act.

10 October 2025 – MPS Legal Services response denying entrapment

Your Directorate of Legal Services, via Andrew Holt responded on 10 October 2025, denying our allegations.

30 November 2025 – Complaint Regarding DoJ Terrorist Recruitment Video

We wrote regarding a video released by DoJ on 27 November 2025 across its website and social media platforms, showcasing individuals arrested under terrorism legislation who explicitly described themselves as "terrorists" and glorified the commission of terrorism offences.

The video included statements such as:

- *"I am a terrorist."*
- *"We just wanted the genocide to stop."*
- *"I took a piece of paper and I wrote on it: I SUPPORT PALESTINE ACTION."*
- *"So I walked up to a policeman and I asked him: Please arrest me."*
- *"I felt great pride..." "I felt hope."*

DoJ posted the video with the caption:

"Opposing genocide is not terrorism. Make your choice. <http://wedonotcomply.org>"


We identified clear offences of:

- Encouragement and glorification of terrorism under sections 1 and 2 Terrorism Act 2006
- Inviting support for a proscribed organisation under section 12 Terrorism Act 2000
- Publishing images under section 13(1A) Terrorism Act 2000

We further explained why the MPS's non-intervention was amplifying confusion and recruiting vulnerable people into criminal exposure.

We noted that despite police being aware of this video, they made no efforts to remove it from popular mainstream platforms viewed by members of the public including children.

We received no response to this letter, and the video remains online.



The chronology above demonstrates a clear, deliberate pattern of conduct by the MPS. In summary, in regards to the DOJ 'Lift the Ban' campaign, the MPS has:

a) **Created a False Belief of Legality**

Through the following conduct, the MPS has actively created a false impression that displaying support for Palestine Action is lawful:

- Stating to LBC (via inspector's letter) that displays from private premises are not offences "due to the precise wording of the legislation" yet stating in the 3 November letter that such displays "do not automatically constitute an offence" but may do in context
- Failing to remove DOJ's website promoting the window poster campaign
- Negotiating with DOJ to postpone events rather than prevent them
- Failing to remove DOJ's recruitment video glorifying terrorism offences

b) **Encouraged Commission of Offences**

By allowing DOJ to continue operating and promoting:

- The window poster campaign (ongoing since 12 September 2025)
- The recruitment video (since 27 November 2025)
- Mass gatherings where participants display "I SUPPORT PALESTINE ACTION" signs

The MPS has facilitated and encouraged vulnerable members of the public to commit terrorism offences.

c) **Failed to Intervene Despite Statutory Duties including Prevent**

Despite having:

- Powers under sections 3-4 Terrorism Act 2006 to remove terrorist publications
- Duties under section 38B Terrorism Act 2000 to act on terrorism information

- Duties under section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to prevent crime
- Duties under section 26 CTSA 2015 (Prevent duty) to prevent people being drawn into terrorism

The MPS has deliberately chosen not to intervene, thereby actively permitting offences to proliferate.

This is not neutral policing, but unlawful policy-making designed to:

1. **Create confusion** about whether support for Palestine Action constitutes a terrorism offence
2. **Encourage the members of the public including vulnerable people** to commit repeat terrorism offences under a false belief these offences are lawful or will not be enforced
3. **Gather evidence** using facial recognition technology and other surveillance tools
4. **Arrest protesters later** when they have committed multiple offences, thereby maximising convictions

It is clear that this amounts to an operational strategy designed to manufacture repeat criminal and terrorism-related exposure among those who express support for Palestine Action—individuals who necessarily fall within the wider category of those advocating for Palestinian rights and protesting against the genocide in Gaza. Rather than preventing alleged offences, the policy facilitates their repetition and accumulation for later enforcement. The foreseeable and obvious effect is that such individuals will face criminal convictions which will, in turn, restrict their ability to engage in peaceful protest and political expression in the future. On any objective analysis, that appears to be the intended consequence of the approach now adopted by the Metropolitan Police.

B. FURTHER FAILURE TO ACT: PALESTINE ACTION WEBSITE FOLLOWING THE HIGH COURT JUDGMENT

Following the High Court judgment of 13 February, Palestine Action made its website accessible again in the UK (<https://global.palestineaction.org/>).

The website contains sections titled, among other things:

- *“Take Action”* – (active recruitment into a proscribed organisation)
- *“Join”* - (active recruitment into a proscribed organisation)
- *“Donate”* – (donations are funding terrorism offences)
- *“Target Map”* – (a complete map of all Palestine Action targets for individuals to pursue action against)
- *Registration to join Palestine Action workshops* – (training by a proscribed organisation)

Should a member of the public engage in any of the above actions, they will be subject to severe penalties under the Terrorism Act 2000, including significant custodial sentences.

It is not credible to suggest that the MPS was unaware of this website. The MPS has publicly stated that it is gathering evidence in relation to support for Palestine Action. In that context, knowledge of the organisation's public-facing infrastructure must be assumed.

Yet no visible action has been taken:

- No takedown request under the Terrorism Act 2006 in respect of terrorist publications;
- No public clarification warning members of the public;
- No enforcement action against the site operators;
- No explanation as to the legal position.

This silence must be considered alongside the MPS's wider public messaging around the DoJ Lift the Ban campaign, and its declared policy of deferring arrests while "*gathering evidence*".

The cumulative effect is foreseeable and obvious.

An ordinary member of the public observing:

- A High Court judgment criticising the proscription decision;
- Media reporting that certain outward displays are "not an offence";
- The absence of immediate arrests at protests;
- An openly accessible website inviting participation and donations without police intervention;

would reasonably conclude that such conduct is lawful. An innocent individual may then donate or sign up, only to find themselves exposed to prosecution for serious terrorism offences carrying very substantial custodial sentences.

The law in this area is strict and the penalties are severe. The police cannot, on the one hand, assert that support for a proscribed organisation is a grave criminal matter, and on the other hand permit recruitment and fundraising infrastructure to operate openly without warning or intervention.

If Palestine Action remains proscribed and its offences related to its proscription remain enforceable and are intended to be unforced – as the MPS have publicly stated, the duty is to prevent and to enforce, not to allow exposure to accumulate. If it does not, the public is entitled to clarity.

What is not lawful is a position of silence and inaction which creates the conditions in which members of the public can unwittingly incur very serious criminal liability.

C. MPS CURRENT POLICING POLICY OF PALESTINE ACTION-RELATED TERRORISM OFFENCES FOLLOWING THE HIGH COURT RULING OF 13TH FEBRUARY 2026 – CONTINUED ENTRAPMENT STRATEGY

The MPS's policy announcement of 13th February 2026, following the High Court judgement of the same day, continues the MPS pattern of entrapment of members of the public – including vulnerable people, omission in policing, and failure to follow their statutory Prevent duties under the CTSA 2015.

In regards to the current policy:

1) The police cannot knowingly ignore alleged terrorism offences

Terrorism offences are among the most serious offences in domestic criminal law. They are not minor public order infractions. They carry exceptional stigma and life-altering consequences.

If the MPS genuinely believes an offence is being committed, it cannot lawfully announce that it will refrain from arrest at the time in order to *“provide opportunities for enforcement at a later date, rather than making arrests at the time.”*

The police cannot lawfully operate a “watch now, prosecute later” model as a standing approach to alleged terrorism offending, particularly where the foreseeable consequence is that members of the public will conclude the conduct is lawful or tolerated (i.e. the police will not enforce it) and will repeat it.

2) The police cannot suspend enforcement in order to harvest more offenders

Your announced approach—non-arrest coupled with evidence collection—is a mechanism for allowing conduct to multiply.

Non-arrest in the presence of police is itself an operational message. It signals to the public that the conduct is lawful, safe, or tolerated in practice. Where campaigns are already encouraging people to commit the conduct, visible non-enforcement will predictably amplify participation and repetition.

The MPS cannot lawfully allow alleged offending to expand in order to increase later enforcement opportunities, prosecutions, and “evidence”.

Moreover, the MPS cannot claim to have no knowledge of these facts and as such, their actions amount to intention to entrap people into committing terrorism offences.

3) The police cannot manufacture repeat criminal liability through strategic inaction

The sequence the MPS has now announced is structurally clear:

- identify “offences” and “the people involved”;
- do not arrest at the time;
- allow repetition;
- collect evidence;
- enforce later

By deliberately not arresting at the time of alleged offence, the MPS is knowingly permitting individuals to commit multiple terrorism offences. Under terrorism legislation, each display is a separate offence. A person who displays support once faces one charge. A person misled into displaying support ten times faces ten charges with cumulative sentencing. The MPS is manufacturing aggravated criminal liability through strategic inaction for the purpose of securing harsher sentences.

On any objective reading of the chronology and the MPS’s declared approach, the conclusion is inescapable: this is a deliberate strategy. It is entrapment in substance and an abuse of power in law.

PREVENT DUTY S.26 COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY ACT 2015 (‘CTSA 2015’)

We remind you again of your statutory safeguarding duty under the Prevent framework (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015), which we raised expressly in our September 26th 2025 letter and reiterated thereafter.

The Prevent duty exists because vulnerable individuals can be manipulated, coerced, or misled into offending.

A policing posture that allows members of the public to be recruited into repeat criminal exposure by campaign messaging, and then reinforces that recruitment through visible non-arrest, is not Prevent. It is its inversion.

The MPS cannot lawfully reconcile its safeguarding obligations with a declared policy of effectively doing nothing, that will foreseeably produce repeat offending by those who have been misled and morally pressured into participation.

DISCRIMINATION

The MPS statement makes the discriminatory nature of their policy explicit: stating in their announcement that this approach “*relates solely*” to the expression of support for Palestine Action.

That means:

- one political constituency is being singled out for a special model of delayed enforcement and retrospective criminalisation; and
- one protest movement is being singled out for “identification” and “evidence gathering” about “the people involved”.

The discriminatory implications are obvious, and the chilling effect on Articles 10 and 11 rights is severe.

DISCRIMINATION – LIVE FACIAL RECOGNITION SURVEILLANCE AND IDENTIFICATION OF LAWFUL PROTESTORS

The MPS’s declared policy of “*gathering evidence of those offences and the people involved to provide opportunities for enforcement at a later date*” is not operationally neutral. It necessarily entails systematic identification, surveillance, and retention of data relating specifically to individuals attending Pro-Palestine protests.

It is a matter of public record that the MPS have deployed facial recognition technology at Palestine-related protests³. It is further publicly reported that the MPS intends to more than double the use of live facial recognition⁴ across London. In circumstances where the MPS has declared that it will identify and gather evidence against those expressing support for Palestine Action, the practical and foreseeable consequence is that including live facial recognition will be deployed at Palestine-related protests in order to identify any individual who may later be characterised as expressing support for Palestine Action.

This extends beyond demonstrations explicitly organised by or in support of Palestine Action. It necessarily captures broader pro-Palestine protests — including peaceful demonstrations advocating

³ <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202401/london-police-deploy-facial-recognition-during-palestine-and-israel-protests>

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/jul/31/met-police-to-more-than-double-use-of-live-facial-recognition>

for Palestinian rights or opposing the war in Gaza — on the premise that within such crowds there may exist individuals expressing support for Palestine Action. In effect, an entire political constituency is rendered subject to collective biometric identification and live facial recognition because a subset of attendees may be suspected of a particular expression offence; an offence which the police have declared they will not make arrests for at the time of commission.

The discriminatory nature of this approach becomes stark when contrasted with the MPS's treatment of other protest movements.

At the United Kingdom rally in September 2025 — an event at which multiple criminal offences were committed, numerous arrests were made, and 26 police officers were injured — facial recognition technology was not deployed. Despite this, the MPS justified⁵ its omission on the claim that it was not operationally necessary.

The discrimination is plain:

- At a far-right demonstration involving violence, injuries to officers, and criminal disorder, biometric surveillance was not deemed necessary.
- At Palestine-related protests, including peaceful mass demonstrations, facial recognition has been deployed and is now embedded within a declared “*evidence gathering*” strategy, despite being peaceful.

The differential treatment is not based on levels of violence or risk to public safety. It is based on political subject matter and is discriminatory.

The result is a two-tier discriminatory policing posture:

1. Pro-Palestine demonstrations are subjected to facial recognition biometric surveillance on the basis that support for a proscribed organisation might be expressed within the crowd.
2. Far-right demonstrations involving actual violence and physical injury to police officers are not subjected to the same surveillance architecture.

That disparity cannot be explained by operational necessity. It gives rise to a clear inference of discriminatory targeting contrary to:

- Section 13 and Section 149 Equality Act 2010;
- Articles 10 and 11 ECHR read with Article 14;
- Article 8 ECHR in conjunction with discriminatory data processing under the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR.

Moreover, the MPS has not disclosed:

- The statutory basis relied upon for mass facial recognition surveillance in this protest context;
- The retention period for biometric data captured;
- Whether data is retained on individuals not suspected of any offence;
- Whether such data is shared with other domestic agencies or foreign states;
- Whether any third-party vendors or foreign-developed technologies have access to this data.

⁵ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c75q3e7xnr9o>

In circumstances where the declared objective is to “*identify the people involved*” for later enforcement, the surveillance posture ceases to be reactive crime detection and becomes a mechanism for compiling identification databases of those attending Palestine-related protests.

This is not neutral policing. It is targeted political surveillance.

When viewed in conjunction with the MPS’s policy of deferring arrest in order to accumulate repeat offences, the deployment of facial recognition technology operates not as a proportionate response to violence or disorder, but as a tool to identify and catalogue individuals engaged in pro-Palestinian political expression.

The discriminatory effect is plain.

CONCLUSION: THIS IS UNLAWFUL, ILLEGAL, AND CONTRARY TO STATUTE

The MPS cannot lawfully do what it has announced.

To be clear, and in plain terms:

- **The police cannot knowingly ignore alleged terrorism offences.**
- **They cannot suspend enforcement in order to harvest more offenders.**
- **They cannot manufacture repeat criminal liability by strategic inaction.**
- **They cannot justify their inaction in order to create a mass biometric database of Pro-Palestinian supporters**

That is not “proportionality”. It is unlawful entrapment. It is contrary to statutory duties. It is discriminatory. It is an abuse of power.

REQUIRED ACTION

We require urgent confirmation in regards to its current policing policy announced on 13th February 2026 that:

1. The MPS will immediately suspend the discriminatory deployment of facial recognition technology at pro-Palestine protests;
2. The MPS will enforce terrorism offences, including the expression or display of support for Palestine Action, at the time such offences are committed, particularly where committed in the presence or sight of a police officer;
3. The MPS will not, whether by action, inaction, omission, or deliberate non-enforcement, encourage, facilitate, or permit the commission or repetition of terrorism-related offences;
4. The MPS will take immediate steps to secure the removal of the Palestine Action website from public access within the United Kingdom

Additionally, in relation to the Defend our Juries ‘Lift the Ban’ campaign:

5. The MPS will issue a clear public statement setting out its legal position regarding the display of posters expressing support for Palestine Action from private dwellings, and confirm unequivocally that the same legal interpretation applies equally to all organisations listed in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000;

6. The MPS will exercise its immediate steps to secure the removal from public access of the DoJ “Lift the Ban” website and any associated material which encourages, glorifies, or invites the commission of terrorism offences;
7. The MPS will commence criminal investigations into those organising or promoting the DoJ campaign insofar as it encourages or invites support for a proscribed organisation contrary to the Terrorism Acts

Given the urgency of this matter, we require the above confirmations within **5 days**. Failing that, we will treat the absence of response as confirmation that the MPS intends to persist with its current approach, which we consider unlawful, discriminatory, and amounting to entrapment in substance and abuse of power.

We look forward to your urgent response.

Yours sincerely,

Right to Protest Ltd